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I. Overview of the dissertation 
 This study examines the ways how political risks associated with foreign direct 
investment in the power sector are managed or dealt with. Political risk is defined as the 
host government’s unwarranted interference with the foreign investment, an interference 
which should be political in nature and should cause damage to the investment’s 
economic interests. Expropriation is the most traditional type of political risk. The 
analysis focuses on two frameworks for dealing with political risks, namely, public 
international laws (PILs) such as international investment treaties and economic 
partnership agreements (EPAs) and contractual arrangements (mainly political risk 
insurance (PRI)-policies, and investor-state guarantees). For the analysis, this study 
selects five Asian countries as host states of power investments and Japan as the home 
country. 
 In connection with international investment treaties, this study examines both 
general and specific standards of treatment against political risks. As for political risk 
management through contracts, this study assesses the available legal means through 
PRI policy-tools provided by third-party actors such as Nippon Export and Investment 
Insurance (NEXI) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and 
investor-state contracts. 
 The study adopted both qualitative and quantitative methods for the two types 
of frameworks for the analysis of managing political risks. The qualitative method 
applied to international investment treaties involves an analysis of recent EPAs 
(2006-2009) entered into force between Japan and five countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) and an examination of the wording of eleven 
standards of treatment along with the legal interpretation of secondary sources. The 
qualitative approach to PRI mechanisms is conducted using primary information 
obtained from the interviews and meetings with NEXI and Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC) executives as well as information contained in their annual reports, 
organisation laws and secondary studies. As for power contracts, the analysis is based 
2 
 
mainly on primary data contained in five real-world power projects implemented by 
Japanese companies in Asian countries. Turning to the quantitative methodology, an 
analysis of international investment treaties develops non-binary measures (a scoring 
card) to provide several snapshots of key legal elements for the protection of power 
investments in each of the five Asian countries, based on the investment and service 
trade chapters as well as on the treaties’ appendices. As to the analysis of the contracts,  
it undertakes a non-numerical evaluation of critical elements analysed in the power 
contracts, based on a five-scale index referring to the reservations or exceptions 
included in each case.  
 This dissertation found that the multi-tier legal framework can be effective in 
protecting against political risk, but such effectiveness depends on the wording of the 
legal components and on the nexuses among them. In particular, this analysis 
demonstrates that several factors – reservations in EPA clauses, lack of clarity in PRI 
tools and non-comprehensiveness in contractual guarantees – may weaken the 
protection against political risk. Finally, even if PRI (provided by NEXI) still plays the 
most dominant role in the protection of Japanese investments, this dissertation asserts 
that the nexus of an institutionalised legal framework would be preferable in addressing 
future challenges of political risk mitigation. 
 
II. Contents of the dissertation 
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: Political risk, the legal means of protection and the assessment of their 
effectiveness  
Part I: The International Law Standards of Treatment and the Japanese EPAs 
Chapter 3: The Risk of Expropriation and the Compensation Standard 
Chapter 4: General Standards of Treatment 
Chapter 5: Specific Standards of Treatment 
Part II: Political Risk Insurance and Investor-State Agreements 
Chapter 6: Political Risk Insurance, the Role of NEXI and Comparison with MIGA 
Chapter 7: Guarantees against Political Risk. Case Study of Power-Investment 
Contracts 
Chapter 8: Nexus of Legal Regimes in the Protection against Political Risk 




 Chapter 1 introduces the issue to be analyzed in the dissertation, i.e., managing 
political risks in foreign investment in the power sector (electricity). This study deals 
with the issue from the point of view of legal analysis. Specifically, the dissertation 
analyzes how political risk can be legally managed and it assesses the effectiveness of 
the legal responses to political risk. 
 Chapter 2 presents detailed discussions on the issues analyzed and the 
methodologies applied in the analysis. Specifically, the three main areas of 
dissertation-discussion are explored in this chapter. Firstly, before determining the 
notion of political risks, the present dissertation describes the categories of risks that 
exist when investing in the infrastructure sectors. It distinguishes commercial from 
political risks as those that usually exist when doing business such as project risks or 
economic risks. Following the discussion of political risk determination, the majority of 
studies agree that the distinction between commercial and non-commercial risks is 
blurred mainly because of the evolving form of contractual agreements between 
investors and countries in investments related to infrastructure sectors. This dissertation, 
after examining the definitions given by previous studies, broadly conceives the notion 
of political risk as the host government’s unwarranted interference with the foreign 
investment, an interference which should be political in nature and should cause damage 
to the investment’s economic interests. Thus, the classification of political risk cannot 
be comprehensive unless the reason behind the state’s unwarranted behaviour is 
investigated (relationship among damage, breach and the reason that triggered the 
breach is required). 
 Secondly, this study focuses on identifying the legal framework that is 
available to foreign investors in order to manage political risks. Previous studies have 
focused on a traditional and non-integrated approach to political risk mitigation by 
analysing methods that require only an affirmative action by investors, such as 
arrangements with export credit agencies (ECAs) and multilateral banks or negotiation 
of sovereign guarantees with host-states. 
 Thirdly, this dissertation follows a combined analytical method consisting of 
qualitative assessment and scoring evaluation. The qualitative assessment is based on 
the analysis of the comprehensiveness of legal countermeasures to political risks, 
examining the broadness and clarity of wording, the inclusiveness of content with 
regards to the existence or lack of a reference to particular elements and the number of 
exceptions made in the relevant clauses or policies. Part I of the dissertation consists of 
an analysis of recent EPAs (2006-2009) and one bilateral investment treaty (BIT) 
entered into force between Japan and the five Asian countries. It examines the wording 
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of eleven standards of treatment along with the legal interpretation of secondary sources 
as well as of international tribunals’ jurisprudence. As per Part II, the qualitative 
approach to PRI mechanisms and policies is based on primary information obtained 
from interviews and meetings with NEXI and JBIC executives, as well as on 
information contained on annual reports, organisation laws and secondary studies about 
Japan’s and World Bank (WB)’s agencies. In relation to power contracts, the 
methodology is based on primary data contained in five real-world power projects 
implemented by Japanese companies in the respective Asian countries.  
 Part I of the dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapter 3 examines the 
standards of treatment responsible for the protection against expropriation and the risk 
of non compensation for the damages suffered by foreign investors. These two risks are 
the most traditional types of political risks. This study analyses what constitutes direct 
and indirect expropriation, lawful and illegal expropriation, and examines what 
international arbitration tribunals require in order to accept a claim of expropriation and 
to award compensation. Most importantly, this chapter examines the conditions that 
make a taking non-compensable. Such conditions are determined according to the 
distinction between general regulatory takings that are permissible and those that are not 
permissible, requiring compensation to the affected investor. In relation to the nature of 
regulatory measures and their distinction from expropriation-measures, a number of 
tests and doctrines of expropriation are investigated. However, such distinction is not an 
easy exercise when the host country issues taxation measures that result in a substantial 
interference with the property of foreign investments. According to the scoring results, 
it is found that some of Japan’s treaties exclude the application of substantive principles 
from taxation measures, resulting possibly in uncertainty. Such treaties are conceived as 
being less effective in the protection against expropriation, leading to low scores. 
However, in relation to compensation standards, most treaties receive high scores due to 
the clear reference to full compensation rights according to Hull’s formula.    
 Chapter 4 assesses the role of general standards of treatment, namely national 
treatment (NT), most favoured-nation treatment (MFN), fair and equitable treatment 
(FET) and full protection and security (FPS), in the protection of Japanese 
power-investments against political risk. It argues that clauses containing general 
standards have not received appropriate attention as a tool for protecting foreign 
investments. NT and MFN protect against the risk of discrimination and they are 
relative standards meaning that they require the same treatment as that domestic or 
third-countries’ investors receive. FET and FPS protect against any arbitrary or unfair 
host government’s behaviour, as well as against the risk of civil disturbance, violence 
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and strife. They are considered to be absolute standards as they do not require any 
comparison between the treatment that Japanese investors receive and the treatment 
provided to other investors. Especially in relation to power investments, the general 
standards of treatment are indispensable due to the dominance of state owned 
enterprises within the electricity sector of most countries. However, assessing the 
effectiveness of general standards in the examined Japan’s Treaties, it is found that 
almost all of them obtain exclusions and limitations. In relation to NT and MFN 
standards, low scores are given for those treaties that exclude general provisions such as 
subsidies and other incentives from the rule of non-discrimination between Japanese 
and other investors. Even lower scores are given when treaties exclude the general 
standards from applying to investments that are specifically related to power sector. In 
relation to FET and FPS standards, when treaties include an additional note, which 
prescribes the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to Japanese investments, it 
is considered to be a substantive limitation to these standards’ protection-capacity, 
resulting in lower scores of effectiveness.                
 Apart from the general standards, Chapter 5 assesses the role of specific 
standards of treatment in mitigating political risk, such as free transfer of funds (FTFs), 
protection from strife and an umbrella clause. It also examines the treaties’ deterrence 
through the provision of investor-state arbitration and subrogation clauses. These 
standards address the protection of investments against specific dangers: prohibition on 
capital repatriation, no remedy for damages due to civil disturbance or violence, breach 
of contracts, difficulty in enforcing legal orders or absence of an impartial judicial 
forum and the non recognition of the home-country’s substitution rights. FTFs and 
protection from strife are not absolute standards. The host states are allowed to limit 
their application. However, any restriction on these standards shall be legitimate 
(permitted under specific conditions) and follow concrete legal principles such as 
non-discriminatory treatment (NT and MFN) that shall be compelled. According to the 
dissertation assessment, it is found that only a few treaties refer explicitly to the above 
principles, when legitimate restrictions occur, and some of them impose excess 
(non-legitimate) restrictions, resulting in a lower score on the effectiveness of their 
protection-degree. With regards to the umbrella clause, almost all treaties receive the 
lowest score due to the absence of such clause in their investment-chapters. Finally, 
with respect to the investor-state arbitration clause, all Japan’s Treaties include such 
clause, with several exceptions and different wordings. In particular, two of them 
exclude from the arbitration right disputes that arise on certain issues, such as on breach 
of NT or disputes that arose prior to the entry into force of the respective treaty.  
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 Part II of the dissertation consists of two chapters. Chapter 6 assesses the 
available legal means in PRI policy-tools provided by Japanese state-agencies, such as 
NEXI and JBIC and by multilateral actors, such as WB agencies, mainly MIGA. In 
theory, PRI agencies are known as the prominent victims because of their involvement 
in deterring the harmful behaviour of host governments and in indemnifying the 
investors for the damage suffered. According to this chapter’s analysis, it is found that 
NEXI has played a crucial role not only in protecting Japanese power-investments 
against several political risks, but also in promoting the economic and industrial 
interests of Japanese enterprises against other countries’ competitors. However, this 
chapter highlights that there are some implications in ΝΕΧΙ’s insurance-tools and 
MIGA’s guarantees, which are related to the ascertainment of investors’ claims. It is 
found that signing a PRI contract does not constitute an automatic elimination of all 
possible cases of political risk. Some risks are not covered by PRI tools and others are 
not clearly addressed. There are technicalities such as a list of insured events that shall 
occur and a number of unclear check-points required by ECAs in order to decide 
whether an insurance-claim is valid or not. The vagueness of such technicalities leads to 
limitations in addressing some political risks, especially expropriation or infringement 
of rights and the change in laws risk. 
 In addition, along with the PRI measures, Chapter 7 analyses the role of 
specific guarantees included in investor-state contracts. It selects the arbitration, 
stabilization, waiver of sovereign immunity and force majeure clauses as the most 
essential in mitigating political risk. It asserts that such guarantees are preferable 
compared to the sovereign guarantees mainly because they do not impose contingent 
liabilities on host-countries’ fiscal budget, as was evidenced during financial crises. 
Even if NEXI is still looking for sovereign guarantees, they are not anymore an option. 
Today, there is a need for signing contracts that on the one hand, do not impose heavy 
contingent liabilities and on the other hand, offer a good design in managing political 
risk. Assessing the design of the four mentioned guarantees, this chapter evaluates the 
contracts based on the inclusion of specific legal elements in each clause, as well as on 
the comprehensiveness of their wording. It is found that some contracts contain a 
best-design clause of political risk management, while unsatisfactory design exists in 
several others. Almost all contracts provide an arbitration clause without choice-of-law 
other than the domestic law; only two contracts obtain a comprehensive sovereignty 
clause, guaranteeing that they irrevocably waive the host state’s immunity over 
jurisdiction of a foreign award, the enforcement and the attachment of its assets. 
Moreover, only one contract provides a separate clause on the stability-of-laws 
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guarantee, while others contain no stabilisation clause. In addition, even if all contracts 
provide a force majeure clause, their risk-transfer design between private and public 
parties varies significantly, resulting in several uncertainties.                
 Chapter 8 examines the effectiveness of the three legal-tiers when they function 
in pairs and all together. Four potential combinations are made: [PIL + PRI], [PIL + 
Contracts], [PRI + Contracts] and [PIL + PRI + Contracts]. This chapter compares 
such combinations of legal regimes by looking into two types of interactions. Firstly it 
analyses the interface (overlapping) of political risk that can be mutually covered. 
Secondly, when no overlapping exists, it examines whether there is a nexus, meaning a 
complementary result of mechanisms that uniquely exist in each legal regime. It is 
found that there is an overlapping of several types of political risk that can be covered 
under each combination of legal regimes. The most important finding is that the legal 
mechanisms that exist only in one regime can also complement the others’ regimes 
framework. Therefore, they can enhance the degree of legal protection against political 
risk when bound together. In particular, synthesising the core argument of such 
complementary roles, PIL regime is unique for its preventive nature of measures 
(ex-ante protection) and for its broader coverage of political risk due to the inclusion of 
general standards of treatment. PRI is unique for offering measures of deterrence 
(ex-post protection) that can address on-time specific types of political risk better than 
any other regime (e.g. natural events-force majeure). Finally, investor-state contracts are 
unique for their specific-preventive nature (tailor-made protection) offering an 
independent structure of risk-transfer design, according to the needs and priorities of the 
parties. However, such nexus constitutes an ideal situation occurring in nominal terms, 
and it does not take into consideration the variations that exist under each regime. In 
reality, as assessed by this dissertation, due to several limitations or weaknesses in each 
legal regime, the actual nexus is more limited than the nominal case described above.   
 In conclusion, Chapter 9 summarises the strengths and the weaknesses in each 
of the Japan’s treaties, in the NEXI and the MIGA insurance policies and in each of the 
five investor-state contracts that have been analysed throughout the dissertation. This 
study has found that the multi-tier legal framework can be effective in protecting against 
political risk, but such effectiveness depends on the wording of the legal components 
and on the nexuses among them. In particular, this analysis demonstrates that several 
factors – limitations in EPA clauses, lack of clarity in PRI tools and 
non-comprehensiveness in contractual guarantees – may weaken the protection against 
political risk. Even if PRI (provided by NEXI) still plays the most dominant role in the 
protection of Japanese investments, this dissertation proposes that the nexus of an 
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institutionalised legal framework would be the most preferable in addressing future 
challenges of political risk mitigation. It implies that Japan needs to expand the number 
of EPA treaties with other nations, to take a more balanced-approach between informal 
(negotiations) and formal legal institutions (litigious-means) and to implement its own 
Model EPA, as is the case for other capital-exporting countries. As for the Japanese 
businesses, they need to depoliticize their disputes with host-states through the 
direct-right to investor-state arbitration, reducing their dependence on Japan’s politics. 
Finally, this study has made three contributions to the legal literature of investment 
protection: the determination of political risk under new areas of law (PIL); the structure 
of a comprehensive framework composed of multi-legal regimes in a separate and in a 
nexus manner; and the assessment of the framework’s effectiveness by using qualitative 
and scoring methodology.   
 
III. Evaluation 
 The power (electricity) sector plays a very important role in achieving 
economic growth in both developed and developing countries. This is particularly so for 
developing countries, where a shortage in the supply of electricity precludes not only 
the producers from fully utilizing productive capacities but also the households from 
living a decent life. Although policy makers realize the need to increase electricity 
generation, expansion of the power sector is not easy as it faces a number of problems. 
One of the most serious problems is the lack of financial resources on the part of 
developing countries, because construction of electricity generation facilities entails a 
large sum of money. As such, many power sector projects in developing countries are 
financed by foreign sources including international development agencies such as the 
World Bank, foreign governments, and foreign companies. In recent years, public and 
private partnership (PPP) has become a popular form of investment in the power sector 
mainly because of risk-sharing and utilization of accumulated experiences in building 
and managing the projects by the private sector. 
 This dissertation examines the issues related to political risks associated with 
the investment in the power sector in developing countries from the legal perspective. 
This study adopts basically two approaches. One is examination of the texts of the 
treaties concerning investment and the other is assessment of the clauses regarding the 
political risks in the actual contracts. Among many interesting findings, this study 
reveals the following two main observations. First, political risk can be effectively 
managed through two legal tiers of protection: public international law and guarantees. 
Second, there is a nexus among different tiers of the legal framework, which has a 
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complementary impact on the mitigation of political risk. 
 The dissertation contributes substantially to the literature on political risks of 
foreign investment in infrastructure, whose importance has been growing in recent years 
as the number of foreign investments in infrastructure such as electricity generation has 
been increasing rapidly. The previous studies on this subject have taken a rather narrow 
approach by focusing on one aspect of political risk. Unlike these previous studies, this 
dissertation adopted a holistic approach towards political risk management. Specifically, 
in comparison with the previous studies, the present study is different in the following 
respects. This study adopted a multi-tier legal framework by using different types of 
assessment techniques and by exploring the role of the following legal regimes: public 
international law consisting of international investment treaties such as EPAs, political 
risk insurance (PRI) provided by export credit agencies (ECAs) and contractual 
guarantees included in investor-state contracts. 
 Another important contribution is the adaptation of the scoring method in the 
analysis of the legal framework. The scoring techniques have been used in the discipline 
of international economics such as in the studies measuring the impediments of host 
countries’ FDI and EPA laws. However, the present dissertation is different than 
previous studies on many aspects. Most importantly, it focuses on the relation of legal 
measures with the issue of political risk mitigation and not on the aspect of investment 
liberalization or protection in general. Moreover, this study uses legal interpretative 
tools for the analysis of the key legal elements. It develops non-binary measures (a 
scoring card) to provide several snapshots of the legal elements for the protection of 
power investments. Such elements are extracted from the investment and 
trade-in-services chapters in the EPAs as well as from the treaties’ appendices. This 
approach is very effective in making comparisons between different laws and treaties. 
 Having discussed a number of important contributions made by the dissertation, 
we, the evaluators, identified several issues that should be pursued in the future. First, 
the number of cases for the analysis should be expanded to draw more general 
observations. A number of extensions can be considered. First, the sector coverage can 
be extended to include sectors other than the power sector such as transportation sector. 
Second, country coverage can be extended in at least two different ways, FDI home and 
host countries. This study investigates the cases where Japan is the only home country. 
It would be interesting to compare the ways political risks are dealt with by other home 
countries such as the United States and European countries. As to the host countries, 
this study examines the cases for East Asian countries. It may be worth comparing with 
developing countries in other regions or developed countries. These comparisons, which 
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may reveal interesting and important differences or similarities, should contribute to 
deeper understanding of the issues. 
 Discussions on the issues from three approaches, that is, public international 
law, political risk insurance, and contractual guarantees, are unique and very important 
contributions. However, these discussions are rather independent and their relations are 
not explicitly considered. A further analysis, which analyzes the interaction of these 
three perspectives, should prove very useful in understanding the entire nature of the 
problem. 
 
IV. Decision of the Committee 
 Considering the results of careful assessment of the submitted dissertation, 
which is presented in section III of this report, the oral presentation of the dissertation 
and subsequent discussions, which was held on December 5, 2011, the Committee 
members came to a unanimous decision that Thomas Nektarios Papanastasiou, the 
author of the submitted dissertation, should be granted a Ph.D. 
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